(PART 1) Antiterrorism Security Measures for Commercial Buildings: inspection and appraisal guidelines
By Krisandra Guidry, Appraisal Journal – September 22, 2007
The importance of physical security in commercial buildings escalated in the wake of the tragic events of September 11, 2001. “As a result, it [became] imperative that critical infrastructures, such as government agencies, military bases, financial institutions, pharmaceutical companies, utilities, and petrochemical plants take appropriate measures to deter terrorist threats.” (1) However, protection against global terrorism is only one aspect of building security. Tenants, landlords, and managers of any high-profile, high-occupancy building must also consider other issues such as domestic terrorists, workplace violence, and disgruntled employees.
During the appraisal process, appraisers should weigh the impact of antiterrorism security measures on the value of a property. The following article focuses on how the design and construction of physical structures, rather than procedural changes, can diminish the damages caused by terrorism. Such enhancements should “block a terrorist’s destructive mission, while providing easy escape for occupants in an emergency.” (2)
Background
Obviously, not all buildings face the same risks. The criteria mentioned in this article do not apply for all projects. “For government facilities and other … buildings that have been identified as possible terrorist targets,” (3) the following will be invaluable to an appraiser.
Regulation and Implementation
All security enhancements must meet local or state building codes. However, security system design is not regulated, and no universal codes or standards apply to all public and private buildings. (4)
The federal government has led the way in developing and adopting security design criteria. The attack on the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City brought monumental changes in security for federal buildings and their leased spaces. The Interagency Security Committee (ISC) Security Design Criteria has been used as a minimum requirement for federal government facilities, especially for non-Department of Defense facilities. (5) The U. S. General Services Administration, the Internal Revenue Service, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the Social Security Administration have embraced the ISC Security Design Criteria. The Department of Homeland Security has indicated that it intends “to use the process through the many agencies under its control.” (6) However, the criteria can be applied to any facility, public or private.
Terrorist Threats to Commercial Buildings
Terrorist threats are of two general forms: blast/ballistic threats and chemical, biological, and radiation (CBR) threats.
Blast threats involve the use of large or small explosive devices. Large amounts of explosives usually require the use of a vehicle or aircraft in order to deliver the device to the intended target. On the other hand, smaller amounts may simply be hand carried into an unsecured area. “Ballistic threats range from random drive-by shootings to high-powered rifle attacks directed at specific targets within the facility.” (7)
The CBR modes of terrorism have a low probability of occurrence, but are potentially more destructive to human life than blast/ballistic weapons. (8) This form of terrorism involves the use of naturally occurring or human-engineered toxins with the express intent to cause illness or death. Chemical threats include the use of gases such as sarin and sulfur mustard gas. Anthrax, smallpox, and the Ebola virus are biological agents that can be transmitted from person to person after their initial release. Radioactive weapons obviously cause injuries from the initial explosion. However, people exposed to the radioactive material are in danger of developing radiation sickness afterward, as well as being at a greater risk of developing cancer later in life. Often, CBR weapons are referred to as weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Owner and Occupant Concerns
According to the General Services Administration, structural enhancements should support “risk mitigation and reduce casualties, property damage and loss of critical function.” (9) They should also provide a safe and pleasant workplace environment without creating a “fortress mentality.” (10) Critics are concerned that certain security measures will interfere with urbanism and promote suburban sprawl if “businesses and government functions retreat behind a new kind of gated community.” (11) They believe systems should blend aesthetically with the buildings, site, and architecture, creating a “layer of transparent security-security that is unobtrusive and visually pleasing.” (12)
The cost effectiveness of such systems is also a concern. It is often hard to justify changes to a design or retrofit an existing building with antiterrorism security measures when the likelihood of an event may be relatively small, but the potential losses catastrophic. It is estimated that the insured property losses associated with the World Trade Center attacks in 2001 were between $50 billion and $35 billion. (13) Unfortunately, expensive security systems offer no guarantees and possibly only limited protection.
Antiterrorism Improvements
There are two ways improvements are protected from attack: access control and structural hardening. During site inspection, a variety of specific antiterrorism design elements may be noted.
Access Control
Access control attempts to deter or deny unauthorized persons access to the facility by limiting points of entry. Access control makes buildings more difficult to get into. The access control measures discussed in this section are site security requirements; vehicle entry/exit and parking; lighting; anti-ram devices; building layout; ventilation safeguards; fire protection; detection devices and electronic security; windows; and doors.
Site Security Requirements. The appraiser may first examine the site for evidence of security requirements such as perimeter buffer zones, sufficient setback, acquisition of adjacent sites, and control of rights-of-way; clear, easy to read signage; landscaping that deters unwanted entry; and security fencing no shorter than eight feet high along the perimeter of the site.
Vehicle Entry/Exit and Parking. To prevent high-speed approaches by unauthorized vehicles, site circulation should be designed to slow incoming traffic, vehicular entry/exits should be kept to a minimum number of locations, and parking should “concentrate activity to the [fullest] extent possible.” (14)
Lighting. Security lights should be mounted very high (i.e., inaccessible without a tall ladder) and protected by shields of wire or polycarbonate. (15) Metal halide bulbs are preferred because they provide “white light which spreads light more evenly over the visual spectrum, helping to improve what people see under it.” Multiple lamps of moderate power provide a more secure environment than a few powerful lamps. (16) It is desirable for some lighting systems to be tied to sensors, turning on when someone or something approaches. The entire lighting circuit (not just the lamp) should be protected.
Anti-Ram Devices. Anti-ram devices provide physical security to a building by acting as a barrier and increasing standoff. Standoff is “the distance between the potential explosion and the structural component.” (17) Bollards set around the perimeter of a commercial building can protect against vehicles carrying explosives. They may be made of steel or concrete. Concrete planters offer standoff protection via a level of transparent security while adding greenery to the site. In addition, speed bumps; walls; trenches; ponds and water basins; static barriers; sculpture and street furniture; and concrete signage can act as barriers. For sites large enough, perimeter security gates along with guard stations or booths bolster security. (18)
Layout of Building. It is very important for high-risk Areas–areas where blast or contaminants are likely to enter–to be physically isolated from the rest of the building. Executive offices “should be placed so that the occupant cannot be seen from an uncontrolled public area such as a street. These offices should face courtyards, internal sites, or controlled areas.” (19) Loading docks, and shipping and receiving areas should be located at least 50 feet away from critical utilities and services. (20) Ideally, the mailroom would be located at an off-site location. However, when this is not possible, the mailroom should be located at the perimeter of the building along an outside wall. It should have adequate space for explosive and CBR disposal containers.
Ventilation Safeguards. Ventilation system safeguards prevent a terrorist attack using the systems to spread chemical, biological, or radiological agents. (21) Access to the ventilation system should be limited only to authorized persons. During inspection, the appraiser may consider outdoor air intake vents and return air grills; these should not be easily observable or accessible by the public. Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems should have detection and filtration systems; emergency HVAC shutoff and control is desirable. Portions of the building may be zoned or have separate HVAC systems. The HVAC system should have the capability to respond to fire detection apparatus and be designed for smoke control and removal. (22)
Fire Protection. Fire protection should include features such as sprinklers, fire alarms, smoke control and fire-resistant barriers, a water system that is adequate for fighting a significant blaze, fireproof elevators, and wide stairwells.
Detection Devices and Electronic Security. When it comes to detection devices and electronic security systems, appraisers may consider the following when valuing such a system: balanced magnetic switches for all exterior doors (including overhead and roll-up doors), (23) glass-break sensors for windows, motion sensors for interior rooms, closed-circuit television (CCTV) surveillance system with recording capability, and duress alarms with hidden call buttons.
Windows. According to the National Security Institute, “The ideal security situation (regarding blasts) is a building with no windows.” (24) However, since fire-safety considerations and municipal ordinances usually preclude such drastic measures, appraisers should look for panes of thermal tempered glass, which break into small pieces that would inflict less injury, (25) steel frames and anchorages “since their inherent resistance to blast may impart large reaction loads to the supporting walls,” (26) and protective coverings, such as bars, gates, mesh screens or shutters over windows, floor vents, transoms, and skylights.
Doors. Points of entry used by the general public and by delivery persons should be limited. However, doors should facilitate emergency evacuation and control during an event. (27) All exterior doors should have locking capability. Key card or biometric (eye scan, fingerprint) access is a preferred feature for high-risk areas. Entrance and exit doors should have hinges and hinge pins on the inside to prevent removal. Solid wood or sheet metal-faced doors provide extra integrity. In the case of lobby doors and partitions made of glass, these doors should be hardened through glazing, or installation of blast resistant glass. (28) Door frames should be made of steel.